SAD EVENT: Packers head couch informed manager of his intention to leave

There was no real search. On the evening of Feb. 1, 1968, Lombardi announced at a press conference that he was stepping down as coach of the Packers to concentrate on his duties as general manager. When he finished explaining his decision, he announced that Phil Bengtson would succeed him as head coach. This was less than three weeks after Super Bowl II, and Lombardi told reporters that night that Bengtson was his choice and nobody else had a say in the decision. Lombardi and the three previous Packers coaches who followed Curly Lambeau had all been selected by the executive committee. It was widely assumed at the time that Lombardi considered only Bengtson and didn’t interview anyone else. However, almost 20 years ago now, Bruce Allen told me that the Packers had twice made overtures to his dad, George Allen, who was coaching the Rams at the time and feuding with his owner, Dan Reeves, including in 1968. That story was never reported, but it would not surprise me if Lombardi at least asked George Allen if he would be interested in the job at some point between the Packers-Rams Western Conference playoff in Milwaukee on Dec. 23, 1967, and the announcement about Bengtson. As for Noll, he was a 36-year-old defensive backfield coach on Don Shula’s staff with the Baltimore Colts. He had been an assistant with the Chargers and Colts for eight years, and had worked under Sid Gillman with the Chargers. As you may know, Lombardi and Gillman both had ties to Army’s Red Blaik. Plus, Noll played for Cleveland when Lombardi was an assistant with the Giants. No doubt, he knew of him. Still, I’d be surprised if Lombardi considered him for the job. Neither Bengtson nor Noll had been a head coach, but Bengtson had run a defense at least and had a reputation for being one of the best defensive coaches in the league.

Ross from Seattle, WA

Were there any hints that Lombardi was unhappy or was everyone caught unprepared?

What could the Packers have done to keep him? They couldn’t offer up ownership. They couldn’t reinstall him as head coach.

I’ll answer your questions one by one. 1) Messy. Yes, it was terribly messy and took the Packers the better part of a week before they agreed to let Lombardi out of his contract. 2) Did he negotiate behind the Packers’ back? Again, yes. Lombardi more or less admitted that as general manager, he gave Washington permission to talk to him about the job without informing the executive committee. Were the Packers awarded compensation? No. Team president Dominic Olejniczak said there was no way to put a value on Lombardi’s worth. It’s pure speculation on my part, but my hunch is that NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle might have pressured the Packers to take that stance. Was it Lombardi’s fault that the Packers had bad drafts from 1967 to 1969? Lombardi was only days away from announcing his decision that he was leaving for Washington when the 1969 draft was held, but he technically was still GM of the Packers at the time. Yet he let Bengtson call the shots in the draft room much to the dismay of personnel director Pat Peppler. I don’t think there’s any question that Lombardi knew he was leaving the Packers and sat out what turned out to be maybe the worst draft in team history, starting with No. 1 pick Rich Moore. As for the 1967 and ’68 drafts, those were the first two common drafts following the AFL-NFL merger. The NFL draft went from 15 teams to 25 and from 305 players to 445. Obviously, the Packers, as NFL champions picking at the bottom of each round, weren’t going to be as successful in the draft as before the merger. In 1968, when they had the fifth pick from a trade, they selected Fred Carr, who might have been as talented as any Packers’ No. 1 pick ever and had an outstanding career. In 1967 and ’68, the Packers drafted two future starters for their offensive line, Bill Lueck and Dick Himes, and also landed Travis Williams, another special talent, in the fourth round. Could the Packers have done anything to keep Lombardi? I don’t believe so. He wanted part ownership of a team and Green Bay couldn’t offer that. He also wanted to get back into coaching. In fact, the morning of the Packers-Washington game in late November 1968, Lombardi met with Edward Bennett Williams, Washington’s president, and there’s reason to believe that’s when the two struck at least a tentative agreement for Lombardi to return to coaching.

Scott from St. Charles, IL

No question, if you go back and read what opposing coaches and players said about the Packers over their three-peat years (1965-67), the defense was what separated those teams from the rest of the league. Offensively, Starr also got a lot of credit for his play-calling, especially during his MVP season and again during the postseason in 1967. In 1965, the Packers went through an offensive slump where they scored 13, 10, 7, 6, 38 and 10 points over six games where they went 3-3 and Lombardi twice benched Starr during games. What saved the season was Paul Hornung’s return to form late in the year when the Packers were on the brink of being eliminated from the race. In 1966, Starr clearly had his best year and was widely praised for his command of the Packers’ offense, especially after he had back-to-back outstanding games against Dallas and Kansas City in the playoffs. In 1967, Starr dealt with several injuries and didn’t play particularly well during the regular season. In fact, the Packers’ press release for the Ice Bowl, which no doubt reflected Lombardi’s thoughts, stated: “Bart Starr has had a frustrating season, plagued by various injuries from the beginning.” The release also noted that Starr seemed to have returned to form in the playoff win over the Rams the week before. Then Starr engineered the winning drive in the Ice Bowl and was at his best again in Super Bowl II. In my book, I devote a lot of words to the role of the power sweep in the offense, both in Hornung’s and Taylor’s heyday, and also afterward; Lombardi’s seemingly hot-and-cold relationship with Starr; and other facets of the offense.

The total yardage stats tell you the Packers ranked third, third and first in defense; and 12th, eighth and ninth in offense from 1965-67. But that’s only part of the story. Without a doubt, the Packers’ running game was never the same after Hornung and Taylor started to slide. But power football was still Lombardi’s trademark. Some of you might remember that in the eighth game of the 1967 season, the Packers lost both of their starting running backs, Elijah Pitts and Jim Grabowski, to what were essentially season-ending injuries. The next week, the Packers faced a good Cleveland team, one that would win its division that year with a 9-5 record, and crushed it, 55-7. The game is best remembered for Travis Williams’ two kickoff returns for touchdowns. But what I found fascinating was this: That week, Donny Anderson made his first pro start at halfback, Ben Wilson made his first start for the Packers at fullback, Williams received his first real look at halfback and Chuck Mercein after being picked up off the scrapheap made his first appearance for the Packers as Wilson’s backup. Those four backs rushed 43 times for 223 yards, a 5.2 average; and Anderson also caught five passes for 103 yards. With Lombardi, opposing coaches still had to respect the run even if he didn’t have two future Hall of Famers in the backfield.

As for the offensive line, it was still a strength in those years, but keep in mind that Lombardi, who was always looking to replace aging veterans, started tinkering with that unit in 1964 and didn’t stop for the next four years, although he sometimes ended up realizing that some of his shuffling was a mistake. He moved Bob Skoronski to center then changed his mind, but also continued to experiment with Ken Bowman, Bill Curry and Bob Hyland there. He benched Fuzzy Thurston, moved Forrest Gregg to guard and also wrote off Jerry Kramer at one point, but then realized Dan Grimm and Steve Wright weren’t the answers as replacements. That whole story is interesting, as well.